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Abstract
We consider a Nash equilibrium between two high-frequency traders in a simple market
impact model with transient price impact and additional quadratic transaction costs. Extending
a result by Scho¨neborn (2008), we prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and
show that for small transaction costs the high-frequency traders engage in a “hot-potato game”,
in which the same asset position is sold back and forth. We then identify a critical value for
the size of the transaction costs above which all oscillations disappear and strategies become
buy-only or sell-only. Numerical simulations show that for both traders the expected costs
can be lower with transaction costs than without. Moreover, the costs can increase with the
trading frequency if there are no transaction costs, but decrease with the trading frequency if
transaction costs are sufficiently high. We argue that these effects occur due to the need of
protection against predatory trading in the regime of low transaction costs.
Keywords: Market impact game, high-frequency trading, Nash equilibrium, transient price impact,
market impact, predatory trading, M -matrix, inverse-positive matrix, Kaluza sign criterion
1 Introduction
According to the Report [10] by CFTC and SEC on the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010, the events that
lead to the Flash Crash included a large sell order of E-Mini S&P 500 contracts:
. . . a large Fundamental Seller (. . . ) initiated a program to sell a total of 75,000 E-
Mini contracts (valued at approximately $4.1 billion). . . . [On another] occasion it took
more than 5 hours for this large trader to execute the first 75,000 contracts of a large
sell program. However, on May 6, when markets were already under stress, the Sell
Algorithm chosen by the large Fundamental Seller to only target trading volume, and
not price nor time, executed the sell program extremely rapidly in just 20 minutes.
The report [10] furthermore suggests that a “hot-potato game” between high-frequency traders
(HFTs) created artificial trading volume that at least contributed to the acceleration of the Funda-
mental Seller’s trading algorithm:
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. . . HFTs began to quickly buy and then resell contracts to each other—generating a
“hot-potato” volume effect as the same positions were rapidly passed back and forth.
Between 2:45:13 and 2:45:27, HFTs traded over 27,000 contracts, which accounted for
about 49 percent of the total trading volume, while buying only about 200 additional
contracts net.
See also Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun [17] and Easley, Lo´pez da Prado, and O’Hara [11] for
additional background.
Scho¨neborn [25] observed that the equilibrium strategies of two competing economic agents, who
trade sufficiently fast in a simple market impact model with exponential decay of price impact, can
exhibit strong oscillations. These oscillations have a striking similarity with the “hot-potato game”
mentioned in [10] and [17]. In each trading period, one agent sells a large asset position to the
other agent and buys a similar position back in the next period. The intuitive reason for this hot-
potato game is to protect against possible predatory trading by the other agent. Here, predatory
trading refers to the exploitation of the drift generated by the price impact of another agent. For
instance, if the other agent is selling assets over a certain time interval, predatory trading would
consist in shortening the asset at the beginning of the time interval and buying back when prices
have depreciated through the sale of the other agent. Such strategies are “predatory” in the sense
that their price impact decreases the revenues of the other agent and thus generate profit at the
other agent’s expense.
In this paper, we continue the investigation of the “hot-potato game”. Our first contribution is
to extend the result of Scho¨neborn [25] by identifying a unique Nash equilibrium for two competing
agents within a larger class of adaptive trading strategies, for general decay kernels, and by giving
an explicit formula for the equilibrium strategies. This explicit formula will be the starting point
for our further mathematical and numerical analysis of the Nash equilibrium. Another new feature
of our approach is the addition of quadratic transaction costs, which can be thought of temporary
price impact in the sense of [6, 4] or as a transaction tax. The main goal of our paper is to study
the impact of these additional transaction costs on equilibrium strategies. Theorem 2.7, our main
result, precisely identifies a critical threshold θ∗ for the size θ of these transaction costs at which all
oscillations disappear. That is, for transactions θ ≥ θ∗ certain “fundamental” equilibrium strategies
consist exclusive of all buy trades or of all sell trades. For θ < θ∗, the “fundamental” equilibrium
strategies will contain both buy and sell trades when the decay of price impact in between two trades
is sufficiently small.
In addition, numerical simulations will exhibit some rather striking properties of equilibrium
strategies. They reveal, for instance, that the expected costs of both agents can be a decreasing
function of θ ∈ [0, θ0] when trading speed is sufficiently high. As a result, both agents can carry out
their respective trades at a lower cost when there are transaction costs, compared to the situation
without transaction costs. Even more interesting is the behavior of the costs as a function of the
trading frequency. We will see that, for θ = θ∗, a higher trading speed can decrease expected trading
costs, whereas the costs typically increase for sufficiently small θ. In particular the latter effect is
surprising, because at first glance a higher trading frequency suggests that one has greater flexibility
in the choice of a strategy and hence can become more cost efficient. So why are the costs then
increasing in the trading frequency? We will argue that the intuitive reason for this effect is that
a higher trading frequency results in greater possibilities for predatory trading by the competitor
and thus requires taking additional measures of protection against predatory trading. Some of these
numerical observations have meanwhile been derived mathematically in our follow-up paper [23],
which has E. Strehle as additional coauthor.
This paper builds on several research developments in the existing literature. First, there are sev-
eral papers on predatory trading such as Brunnermeier and Pedersen [8], Carlin et al. [9], Scho¨neborn
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and Schied [26], and the authors [24] dealing with Nash equilibria for several agents that are active in
a market model with temporary and permanent price impact. A discrete-time market impact game
with asymmetric information was analyzed by Moallemi et al. [20]. In contrast to these previous
studies, the transient price impact model we use here goes back to Bouchaud et al. [7] and Obizhaeva
and Wang [21]. It was further developed in [1, 2, 12, 3, 22], to mention only a few related papers.
As first observed in [25], the qualitative features of Nash equilibria for transient price impact differ
dramatically from those obtained in [9, 26, 24] for an Almgren–Chriss setting. We refer to [13, 19] for
recent surveys on the price impact literature and extended bibliographies. Among the utilized math-
ematical tools are the theory of M -matrices [5], the correspondence between the inverses of triangular
Toeplitz matrices and reciprocals of power series [28], and Kaluza’s sign criterion for reciprocal power
series [16, 27].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 we explain our modeling framework. The
existence and uniqueness theorem for Nash equilibria is stated in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we
analyze the oscillatory behavior of equilibrium strategies. Here we will also state our main result,
Theorem 2.7, on the critical threshold for the disappearance of oscillations. Our numerical results and
their interpretation are presented in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4. Particularly, Section 2.4 contains the
simulations for the behavior of the costs as a function of transaction costs and of trading frequency
in the cases with and without transaction costs. The proofs of our results are given in Section 3. We
conclude in Section 4.
2 Statement of results
2.1 Modeling framework
We consider two financial agents, X and Y , who are active in a market impact model for one risky
asset. Market impact will be transient and modeled as in [3]; see also [7, 21, 2, 12, 22] for closely
related or earlier versions of this model, which is sometimes called a propagator model. When none
of the two agents is active, asset prices are described by a right-continuous martingale1 S0 = (S0t )t≥0
on a filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t≥0,F ,P), for which F0 is P-trivial. The process S0 is often
called the unaffected price process. Trading takes place at the discrete trading times of a time grid
T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, where 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T . Both agents are assumed to use trading
strategies that are admissible in the following sense.
Definition 2.1. Suppose that a time grid T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN} is given. An admissible trading strategy
for T and Z0 ∈ R is a vector ζ = (ζ0, . . . , ζN) of random variables such that
(a) each ζi is Fti-measurable and bounded, and
(b) Z0 = ζ0 + · · ·+ ζN P-a.s.
The set of all admissible strategies for given T and Z0 is denoted by X (Z0,T).
For ζ ∈ X (Z0,T), the value of ζi is taken as the number of shares traded at time ti, with a
positive sign indicating a sell order and a negative sign indicating a purchase. Thus, the requirement
(b) in the preceding definition can be interpreted by saying that Z0 is the inventory of the agent at
time 0 = t0 and that by time tN = T (e.g., the end of the trading day) the agent must have a zero
inventory. The assumption that each ζi is bounded can be made without loss of generality from an
economic point of view.
1The martingale assumption is natural from an economic point of view, because we are interested here in high-
frequency trading over short time intervals [0, T ]. See also the discussions in [3, 18] for additional arguments.
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When the two agents X and Y apply respective strategies ξ ∈X (X0,T) and η ∈X (Y0,T), the
asset price is given by
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t −
∑
tk<t
G(t− tk)(ξk + ηk), (1)
where G : R+ → R+ is a function called the decay kernel. Thus, at each time tk ∈ T, the combined
trading activities of the two agents move the current price by the amount −G(0)(ξk + ηk). At a later
time t > tk, this price impact will have changed to −G(t− tk)(ξk + ηk). From an economic point of
view it would be reasonable to assume that G is nonincreasing, but this assumption is not essential
for our results to hold mathematically. But we do assume throughout this paper that the function
t 7→ G(|t|) is strictly positive definite in the sense of Bochner: For all n ∈ N, t1, . . . , tn ∈ R, and
x1, . . . , xn ∈ R we have
n∑
i,j=1
xixjG(|ti − tj|) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if x1 = · · · = xn = 0. (2)
As observed in [3], this assumption rules out the existence of price manipulation strategies in the sense
of Huberman and Stanzl [14]. It is satisfied as soon as G is convex, nonincreasing, and nonconstant;
see, e.g., [3, Proposition 2] for a proof.
Let us now discuss the definition of the liquidation costs incurred by each agent. When only one
agent, say X, places a nonzero order at time tk, then we are in the situation of [3] and the price is
moved linearly from Sξ,ηtk to S
ξ,η
tk+
:= Sξ,ηtk −G(0)ξk. The order ξk is therefore executed at the average
price 1
2
(Sξ,ηtk+ + S
ξ,η
tk
) and consequently incurs the following expenses:
−1
2
(
Sξ,ηtk+ + S
ξ,η
tk
)
ξk =
G(0)
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk.
Suppose now that the order ηk of agent Y is executed immediately after the order ξk. Then the price
is moved linearly from Sξ,ηtk+ to S
ξ,η
tk+
−G(0)ηk, and the order of agent Y incurs the expenses
−1
2
(
Sξ,ηtk+ + S
ξ,η
tk+
−G(0)ηk
)
ηk =
G(0)
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk +G(0)ξkηk.
So greater latency results in the additional cost term G(0)ξkηk for agent Y . Clearly, this term appears
in the expenses of agent X, if the roles of X and Y are reversed. In the sequel, we are going to assume
that none of the two agents has an advantage in latency over the other. Therefore, if both agents
place nonzero orders at time tk, execution priority is given to that agent who wins an independent
coin toss.
In addition to the liquidation costs motivated above, we will also impose that each trade ζk incurs
quadratic transaction costs of the form θζ2k , where θ is a nonnegative parameter. The assumption
of quadratic transaction costs will be discussed at the end of Section 2.2, after the statement of
Theorem 2.5.
Definition 2.2. Suppose that T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, X0 and Y0 are given. Let furthermore (εi)i=0,1,... be
an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli (1
2
)-distributed random variables that are independent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft).
Then the costs of ξ ∈X (X0,T) given η ∈X (Y0,T) are defined as
CT(ξ|η) = X0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(G(0)
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk + εkG(0)ξkηk + θξ2k
)
(3)
and the costs of η given ξ are
CT(η|ξ) = Y0S00 +
N∑
k=0
(G(0)
2
η2k − Sξ,ηtk ηk + (1− εk)G(0)ξkηk + θη2k
)
.
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The term X0S
0
0 corresponds to the book value of the position X0 at time t = 0. If the position X0
could be liquidated at book value, one would incur the expenses −X0S00 . Therefore, the liquidation
costs as defined in (3) are the difference of the actual accumulated expenses, as represented by the
sum on the right-hand side of (3), and the expenses for liquidation at book value. The following
remark provides further comments on our modeling assumptions.
Remark 2.3. The market impact model we are using here has often been linked to the placement
of market orders in a block-shaped limit order book, and a bid-ask spread is sometimes added to the
model so as to make this interpretation more feasible [21, 1]. For a strategy consisting exclusively
of market orders, the bid-ask spread will lead to an additional fee that should be reflected in the
corresponding cost functional. In reality, however, most strategies will involve a variety of different
order types and one should think of the costs (3) as the costs averaged over order types, as is often
done in the market impact literature. For instance, while one may have to pay the spread when
placing a market order, one essentially earns it back when a limit order is executed. Moreover,
high-frequency traders often have access to a variety of more exotic order types, some of which can
pay rebates when executed. It is also possible to use crossing networks or dark pools in which orders
are executed at mid price. So, for a setup of high-frequency trading, taking the bid-ask spread as
zero in (1) is probably more realistic than modeling every single order as a market order and to
impose the fees. The existence of hot-potato games in real-world markets, such as the one quoted
from [10] in Section 1, can be regarded as an empirical justification of the zero-spread assumption,
because such a trading behavior could never be profitable if each trader had to pay the full spread
upon each execution of an order. See also the end of Section 2.2 for a discussion on how to replace
our quadratic transaction costs by piecewise linear ones.
2.2 Nash equilibrium
We now consider agents who need to liquidate their current inventory within a given time frame and
who are aiming to minimize the expected costs over admissible strategies. The need for liquidation
can arise due to various reasons. For instance, Easley, Lo´pez da Prado, and O’Hara [11] argue that
the toxicity of the order flow preceding the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010, has led the inventories of
several high-frequency market makers to grow beyond their risk limits, thus forcing them to unload
their inventories.
When just a single agent is considered, the minimization of the expected execution costs is a
well-studied problem; we refer to [3] for an analysis within our current modeling framework. Here we
are going to investigate the optimal strategies of our two agents, X and Y , under the assumption that
both have full knowledge of the other’s strategy and maximize the expected costs of their strategies
accordingly. In this situation, it is natural to define optimality through the following notion of a
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.4. For given time grid T and initial values X0, Y0 ∈ R, a Nash equilibrium is a pair
(ξ∗,η∗) of strategies in X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T) such that
E[CT(ξ∗|η∗) ] = min
ξ∈X (X0,T)
E[CT(ξ|η∗) ] and E[CT(η∗|ξ∗) ] = min
η∈X (Y0,T)
E[CT(η|ξ∗) ].
To state our formula for this Nash equilibrium, we need to introduce the following notation. For
a fixed time grid T = {t0, . . . , tN}, we define the (N + 1)× (N + 1)-matrix Γ by
Γi,j = G(|ti−1 − tj−1|), i, j = 1, . . . , N + 1, (4)
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and for θ ≥ 0 we introduce
Γθ := Γ + 2θ Id. (5)
We furthermore define the lower triangular matrix Γ˜ by
Γ˜ij =

Γij if i > j,
1
2
G(0) if i = j,
0 otherwise.
(6)
Note that Γ = Γ˜ + Γ˜>, where > denotes the transpose of a matrix or vector. We will write 1 for
the vector (1, . . . , 1)> ∈ RN+1. A strategy ζ = (ζ0, . . . , ζN) ∈ X (Z0,T) will be identified with the
(N + 1)-dimensional random vector (ζ0, . . . , ζN)
>. Conversely, any vector z = (z1, . . . , zN+1)> ∈
RN+1 can be identified with the deterministic strategy ζ with ζk = zk+1. We also define the two
vectors
v =
1
1>(Γθ + Γ˜)−11
(Γθ + Γ˜)
−11
w =
1
1>(Γθ − Γ˜)−11
(Γθ − Γ˜)−11.
(7)
It will be shown in Lemma 3.2 below that the matrices Γθ + Γ˜ and Γθ − Γ˜ are indeed invertible and
that the denominators in (7) are strictly positive under our assumption (2) that G(| · |) is strictly
positive definite. Recall that we assume (2) throughout this paper.
In the case G(t) = γ + λe−ρt for constants γ ≥ 0 and λ, ρ > 0, the existence of a unique Nash
equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies was established in Theorem 9.1 of [25]. Our
subsequent Theorem 2.5 extends this result in a number of ways: we allow for general positive
definite decay kernels, include transaction costs, give an explicit form of the deterministic Nash
equilibrium, and show that this Nash equilibrium is also the unique Nash equilibrium in the class of
adapted strategies. Our explicit formula for the equilibrium strategies will be the starting point for
our further mathematical and numerical analysis of the Nash equilibrium. Also our proof is different
from the one in [25], which works only for the specific decay kernel G(t) = λe−ρt + γ.
Theorem 2.5. For any strictly positive definite decay kernel G, time grid T, parameter θ ≥ 0, and
initial values X0, Y0 ∈ R, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) ∈ X (X0,T) ×X (Y0,T).
The optimal strategies ξ∗ and η∗ are deterministic and given by
ξ∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)v +
1
2
(X0 − Y0)w,
η∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)v − 1
2
(X0 − Y0)w.
(8)
The formula (8) shows that the vectors v andw form a basis for all possible equilibrium strategies.
It follows that in analyzing the Nash equilibrium it will be sufficient to study the two cases ξ∗ = v =
η∗ for X0 = 1 = Y0 and ξ∗ = w = −η∗ for X0 = 1 = −Y0.
Let us now comment on our choice of quadratic transaction costs. Such quadratic transaction
costs are often used to model “slippage” arising from temporary price impact; see [6, 4] and [12,
Section 2.2]. Nevertheless, proportional transaction costs might be more realistic in many situations,
and so the question arises if our results will change when the quadratic transaction costs θξ2k are
replaced by (piecewise) linear transaction costs. This question is at least partially answered by the
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following result. It states that our quadratic transaction cost function can be replaced by proportional
transaction costs in a neighborhood of the origin without affecting the Nash equilibrium. Since the
main difference of quadratic and proportional transaction costs is their behavior at the origin, one
may therefore guess that similar results as obtained in the following sections for quadratic transaction
costs might also hold for proportional transaction costs.
Proposition 2.6. In the context of Theorem 2.5, there exists a piecewise linear, increasing, convex,
and continuous transaction cost function τ with τ(0) = 0 such that (ξ∗,η∗) from (8) is a Nash equi-
librium in X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T) for the the modified expected cost functional in which the quadratic
transaction cost function x 7→ θx2 is replaced with x 7→ τ(|x|).
The transaction cost function τ constructed in the preceding proposition is of the form
τ(|x|) = θ0|x|+
M∑
k=1
θk(|x| − ck)1[ck,∞)(|x|)
for certain coefficients θk > 0 and thresholds 0 < c1 < · · · cM . Transaction costs of this form can
model a transaction tax that is subject to tax progression. With such a tax, small orders, such as
those placed by small investors, are taxed at a lower rate than large orders, which may be placed
with the intention of moving the market.
2.3 The hot-potato game
We now turn toward a qualitative analysis of the equilibrium strategies. By means of numerical
simulations and the analysis of a particular example, Scho¨neborn [25, Section 9.3] observed that the
equilibrium strategies may exhibit strong oscillations if θ = 0, the time grid is equidistant, and G
is of the form G(t) = λe−ρt + γ for constants λ, ρ > 0 and γ ≥ 0. As a matter of fact, numerical
simulations, such as those presented in Figures 1 and 3, suggest that such oscillations can be observed
for a large class of decay kernels as soon as transaction costs vanish (θ = 0) and the time grid is
sufficiently fine. We refer to Remark 2.10 for a possible financial interpretation of the oscillations
arising in the hot-potato game. For a single financial agent, however, optimal strategies will always
be buy-only or sell-only for convex, nonincreasing decay kernels, which include those used in Figures 1
and 3 (see [3, Theorem 1]). Therefore, the oscillations in our two-agent setting that are observed in
these figures must necessarily result from the interaction of both agents.
It is intuitively clear that increased transaction costs will penalize oscillating strategies and thus
lead to a smoothing of the equilibrium strategies. As a matter of fact, one can see in Figure 2 that for
θ = 2 all oscillations have disappeared so that equilibrium strategies are then buy-only or sell-only.
One can therefore wonder whether between θ = 0 and θ = 2 there might be a critical value θ∗ at
which all oscillations of v and w disappear, but below which oscillations are present. That is, for
θ ≥ θ∗ all equilibrium strategies should be either buy-only or sell-only, while for θ < θ∗ equilibrium
strategies should contain both buy and sell trades (at least for certain values of N and T ). The
following theorem confirms that such a critical value θ∗ does indeed exist. We can even determine
its precise value in case that we are dealing with equidistant time grids,
TN :=
{kT
N
∣∣∣ k = 0, 1, . . . , N}, N ∈ N. (9)
And we will be able to say even more in case G is of the form
G(t) = λe−ρt + γ for constants λ, ρ > 0 and γ ≥ 0. (10)
It is well known that this class of decay kernels satisfies our assumption (2) (see, e.g., [3, Example
1]), and they are clearly log-convex.
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Theorem 2.7. Suppose that G is a continuous, positive definite, strictly positive, and log-convex
decay kernel and that TN denotes the equidistant time grid (9). Then the following conditions are
equivalent.
(a) For every N ∈ N and T > 0, all components of w are nonnegative.
(b) θ ≥ θ∗ = G(0)/4.
If, moreover, G is of the form (10), then conditions (a) and (b) are equivalent to:
(c) For every N ∈ N and T > 0, all components of v are nonnegative.
In the case θ < θ∗, one can actually obtain some stronger results on the existence of oscillations in
the vector w. These are stated in the following two propositions. First, we deal with the oscillations
of the signs of the last three trades of w, which are present as soon as θ < θ∗ and the time grid
is sufficiently fine. Recall that w completely determines the unique Nash equilibrium with initial
conditions X0 = −Y0.
Proposition 2.8. Suppose that G is a continuous and positive definite decay kernel that is nonin-
creasing in a neighborhood of zero. Then for 0 ≤ θ < θ∗ there exists δ > 0 such that for all time
grids T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN} with tN − tN−1 < δ and tN−1 − tN−2 < δ, the last three components of the
vector w satisfy wN+1 > 0, wN < 0, and wN−1 > 0.
The simulations in Figures 1 and 3 show that for θ = 0 actually all components of the vectors w
and v have oscillating signs. The following propositions establishes the existence of oscillations for
w in the case of an exponential decay kernel and an equidistant time grid.
Proposition 2.9. Suppose that G is of the form G(t) = λe−ρt for constants λ, ρ > 0 and that TN
denotes the equidistant time grid (9) for some given T > 0. Then there exists N0 ∈ N such that for
each N ≥ N0 there exists δ > 0 so that for 0 ≤ θ < δ all entries of the vector w = (w1, . . . , wN+1)
are nonzero and have alternating signs.
We refer to the right-hand panel of Figure 1 for an illustration of the oscillations of the vector w.
As shown in the left-hand panel of the same figure, similar oscillations occur for the vector v and
hence for equilibria with arbitrary initial conditions. The mathematical analysis for v, however, is
much harder than for w, and at this time we are not able to prove a result that could be an analogue
of Proposition 2.9 for the vector v. The existence of oscillations of w and v is also not limited to
exponential decay kernels as can be seen from numerical experiments; see Figure 3 for power law
decay and a randomly generated, non-equidistant time grid.
Remark 2.10. In this remark we will discuss a possible financial explanation for the oscillations
of equilibrium strategies observed for small values of θ. As mentioned above, the source for these
oscillations must necessarily lie in the interaction between the two agents. As observed in previous
studies on multi-agent equilibria in price impact models such as [8, 9, 26], the dominant form of
interaction between two players is predatory trading, which consists in the exploitation of price impact
generated by another agent. Such strategies are “predatory” in the sense that they generate profit
by simultaneously decreasing the other agent’s revenues. Since predators prey on the drift created
by the price impact of a large trade, protection against predatory trading requires the cancellation
of previously created price impact. Under transient price impact, the price impact of an earlier
trade, say ζ0, can be cancelled by placing an order ζ1 of the opposite side. For instance, taking
ζ1 := −ζ0G(t1 − t0) will completely eliminate the price impact of ζ0 while the combined trades
execute a total of ξ0(1−G(t1− t0)) shares. In this sense, oscillating strategies can be understood as
a protection against predatory trading by opponents (see also [25, p.150]).
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Figure 1: Vectors v (left) and w (right) for the equidistant time grid T50, G(t) = e−t, θ = 0, and
T = 1. By (8), (v,v) is the equilibrium for X0 = Y0 = 1, and (w,−w) is the equilibrium for
X0 = −Y0 = 1. Yet, some individual components of both v and w exceed in either direction 60% of
the sizes of the initial positions X0 and Y0.
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Figure 2: Vectors v (left) and w (right) for the equidistant time grid T50, G(t) = e−t, θ = 2, and
T = 1.
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Figure 3: Vectors v (left) and w (right) for power-law decay G(t) = 1/
√
1 + t and a time grid
generated from 50 independent uniformly distributed random variables on.
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Remark 2.11. Alfonsi et al. [3] discovered oscillations for the trade execution strategies of a single
trader under transient price impact if price impact does not decay as a convex function of time.
These oscillations, however, result from an attempt to exploit the delay in market response to a
large trade, and they disappear if price impact decays as a convex function of time [3, Theorem 1].
In particular, when there is just one agent active and G is convex, nonincreasing, and nonconstant
(which is, e.g., the case under assumption (10)), then for each time grid T there exists a unique
optimal strategy, which is either buy-only or sell-only. When (10) holds and θ = 0, this strategy is
known explicitly; see [1].
Remark 2.12. Based on numerical simulations, we believe that the statements of Theorem 2.7 and
Proposition 2.9 can probably be improved. Specifically, we conjecture that the equivalence between
the conditions (a), (b), and (c) in Theorem 2.7 remains true for all positive definite decay kernels.
Our current proofs, however, cannot be extended beyond our stated conditions. Specifically, the
implication of (b)⇒(a) in Theorem 2.7 exploits the Toeplitz structure of the upper triangular matrix
Γθ − Γ˜, which only holds for equidistant time grids. We then use the fact that the inverse of a
triangular Toeplitz matrix corresponds to the (formal) reciprocal of a power series, and we use the
celebrated Kaluza sign criterion [16, 27] to determine the signs of this reciprocal power series. Here,
the log-convexity of G is essential. The proof of the implication (b)⇒(c) relies on the theory of
M -matrices as presented in [5]. In particular, we rely on the fact that the matrix Γ−1(Γ˜ + 1
2
Id) is
a non-singular M -matrix for G(t) = e−ρt (Lemma 3.11), which is no longer true, e.g., for power
law decay G(t) = 1/(1 + t)p with p > 0. Similarly, the proof of Proposition 2.9 exploits the fact
that the upper triangular matrix Γ − Γ˜ can be inverted explicitly if the time grid is equidistant
and G(t) = e−ρt. Surprisingly, although the matrix Γ has an explicit inverse for any time grid if
G(t) = e−ρt (see [1, Theorem 3.4]), the structure of (Γ− Γ˜)−1 becomes quite involved if the time grid
is not equidistant. Already for equidistant time grids, the same can be said of the matrix (Γ + Γ˜)−1,
which is needed to compute the vector v.
2.4 The impact of transaction costs and trading frequency on the ex-
pected costs
Due to our explicit formulas (7) and (8), it is easy to analyze the Nash equilibrium numerically.
These numerical simulations exhibit several striking effects in regards to monotonicity properties of
the expected costs.
In Figure 4 we have plotted the expected costs E[CTN (ξ∗|η∗) ] = E[CTN (η∗|ξ∗) ] for X0 = Y0,
G(t) = e−t, and T = 1 as a function of the trading frequency, N . The first observation one probably
makes when looking at this plot is the fact that for θ = 0 the expected costs exhibit a sawtooth-like
pattern; they alternate between two increasing trajectories, depending on whether N is odd or even.
These alternations are due to the oscillations of the optimal strategies, which also alternate with N .
As can be seen from the figure, the sawtooth pattern essentially disappears already for very small
values of θ such as for θ = 0.01.
A more interesting observation is the fact that for θ = 0, θ = 0.01, and θ = 0.1 the expected
costs E[CT2N (ξ∗|η∗) ] (or alternatively E[CT2N+1(ξ∗|η∗) ]) are increasing in N . This fact is surprising
because a higher trading frequency should normally lead to a larger class of admissible strategies.
As a result, traders have greater flexibility in choosing a strategy and in turn should be able to pick
more cost efficient strategies. So why are the costs then increasing in N? The intuitive explanation is
that a higher trading frequency increases also the possibility for the competitor to conduct predatory
strategies at the expense of the other agent (see Remark 2.10). In reaction, this other agent needs to
take stronger protective measures against predatory trading. As discussed in Remark 2.10, protection
10
against predatory trading can be obtained by erasing (part of) the previously created price impact
through placing an order of the opposite side. The result is an oscillatory strategy, whose expected
costs increase with the number of its oscillations.
Still in Figure 4, the expected costs E[CTN (ξ∗|η∗) ] for the case θ = θ∗ = 0.25 exhibit a very
different behavior. They no longer alternate in N and are decreasing as a function of the trading
frequency. The intuitive explanation is that transaction costs of size θ∗ = 0.25 discourage predatory
trading to a large extend, so that agents can now benefit from a higher trading frequency and pick
ever more cost-efficient strategies as N increases.
The most surprising observation in Figure 4 is the fact that for sufficiently large N the expected
costs for θ > 0 fall below the expected costs for θ = 0. That is, for sufficiently large trading
frequency, adding transaction costs can decrease the expected costs of all market participants (recall
that for X0 = Y0 both agents have the same optimal strategies and, hence, the same expected costs).
This fact is further illustrated in Figure 5, which exhibits a very steep initial decrease of the expected
costs as a function of θ. After a minimum of the expected costs is reached at θ ≈ 0.06, there is a
slow and steady increase of the costs with an approximate slope of 0.002.
The key to understanding the behavior of expected equilibrium costs as a function of trading
frequency and transaction costs rests in the interpretation of the oscillations in equilibrium strategies
as a protection against predatory trading by the opponent (see Remark 2.10). Note that a predatory
trading strategy is necessarily a “round trip”, i.e., a strategy with zero inventory at t = 0 and T = 0
(the strategy of a predatory trader with nonzero initial position would consist of a superposition of a
predatory round trip and a liquidation strategy for the initial position). It therefore must consist of a
buy and a sell component and is hence stronger penalized by an increase in transaction costs than a
buy-only or sell-only strategy. As a result, increasing transaction costs leads to an overall reduction
of the proportion of predatory trades in equilibrium. In consequence, both agents in our model
can reduce their protection against predatory trading and therefore use more efficient strategies to
carry out their trades. They can thus fully benefit from higher trading frequencies, which leads to
the observed decrease of expected costs as a function of N if θ is sufficiently large. Moreover, for
appropriate values of θ > 0, the benefit of increased efficiency outweighs the price to be paid in
higher transaction costs and so an overall reduction of costs is achieved.
Let us point out that, in the case G(t) = e−ρt, many qualitative observations made in this section
by means of numerical experiments have meanwhile been given rigorous mathematical proofs in our
follow-up paper [23], which has Elias Strehle as additional coauthor. There, we investigate the limits
of equilibrium strategies and expected costs as N ↑ ∞. We prove that, for θ = 0, both strategies and
costs oscillate indefinitely between two accumulation points, for which we provide explicit formulas.
For θ > 0, however, strategies and costs converge toward limits that are independent of θ. We then
show that the limiting strategies form a Nash equilibrium for a continuous-time version of the model
with θ = θ∗, and that the corresponding expected costs coincide with the high-frequency limits of
the discrete-time equilibrium costs. For θ 6= θ∗, however, continuous-time Nash equilibria do not
exist unless X0 = Y0 = 0.
Another interesting question is the comparison of the expected costs of the equilibrium strategies
with the expected costs that both agents would have if none of them were aware of the other’s trading
activities. In this case, a trader with initial inventory Z0 will apply the strategy
ζ̂Z0 =
Z0
1>Γ−1θ 1
Γ−1θ 1,
which is the strategy for a single trader facing the positive definite decay G and transaction costs
measured by the parameter θ ≥ 0; this follows by taking the positive definite decay kernel G(t) +
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Figure 4: Expected costs E[CTN (ξ∗|η∗) ] = E[CTN (η∗|ξ∗) ] for various values of θ as a function of
trading frequency, N , with the equidistant time grid TN , T = 1, G(t) = e−t, and X0 = Y0 = 1.
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
0.740
0.745
0.750
0.755
θ
Figure 5: Expected costs E[CT501(ξ∗|η∗) ] as a function of θ for initial values X0 = Y0 = 1 and
G(t) = e−t. The costs decrease steeply from the value 0.7567 at θ = 0 until a minimum value of
about 0.7397 at θ = 0.06. From then on there is a moderate and almost linear increase with, e.g.,
a value of 0.7407 at θ = 0.5. This increase corresponds to a slope of approximately 0.002. We took
the equidistant time grid T501 and ρ = 1.
1{0}(t) in [3, Proposition 1]. We can thus define a price of anarchy in our situation by letting
PoAN(θ,X0, Y0) :=
E[CTN (ζ̂X0|ζ̂Y0) ] + E[CTN (ζ̂Y0|ζ̂X0) ]
E[CTN (ξ∗|η∗) ] + E[CTN (η∗|ξ∗) ]
,
where ξ∗ and η∗ are the equilibrium strategies from (8). See Figure 6 for a plot.
3 Proofs
3.1 Proof of Theorem 2.5 and Proposition 2.6
Lemma 3.1. The expected costs of an admissible strategy ξ ∈ X (X0,T) given another admissible
strategy η ∈X (Y0,T) are
E[CT(ξ|η) ] = E
[ 1
2
ξ>Γθξ + ξ>Γ˜η
]
. (11)
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Figure 6: Price of anarchy, PoA101(θ,X0, Y0), as a function of θ for X0 = 1 and Y0 = −1 (left) and
X0 = 1 and Y0 = 1 (right) for G(t) = e
−t. The steep increase on the right-hand panel is due to
the initial decrease of the expected costs for X0 = Y0 = 1 as shown in Figure 5. The steep of the
price of anarchy in the right-hand panel is the result of the decrease of the corresponding equilibrium
strategies as shown in Figure 5.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume G(0) = 1. Since the sequence (εi)i=0,1,... is inde-
pendent of σ(
⋃
t≥0Ft) and the two strategies ξ and η are measurable with respect to this σ-field,
we get E[ εkξkηk ] = 12E[ ξkηk ]. Hence,
E[CT(ξ|η) ]−X0S00 = E
[ N∑
k=0
(1
2
ξ2k − Sξ,ηtk ξk + εkξkηk + θξ2k
)]
= E
[ N∑
k=0
(
1
2
ξ2k +
1
2
ξkηk − ξk
(
S0tk −
k−1∑
m=0
(ξm + ηm)G(tk − tm)
)
+ θξ2k
)]
= E
[
−
N∑
k=0
ξkS
0
tk
+
1
2
N∑
k=0
ξ2k +
N∑
k=0
ξk
k−1∑
m=0
ξmG(tk − tm)
+
N∑
k=0
(
ξk
(1
2
ηk +
k−1∑
m=0
ηmG(tk − tm)
)
+ θξ2k
)]
.
Since each ξk is Ftk-measurable and S
0 is a martingale, we get from condition (b) in Definition 2.1
that
E
[ N∑
k=0
ξkS
0
tk
]
= E
[ N∑
k=0
ξkS
0
T
]
= X0E[S0T ] = X0S00 .
Moreover,
1
2
N∑
k=0
ξ2k +
N∑
k=0
ξk
k−1∑
m=0
ξmG(tk − tm) = 1
2
N∑
k,m=0
ξkξmG(|tk − tm|) = 1
2
ξ>Γξ,
and
N∑
k=0
ξk
(1
2
ηk +
k−1∑
m=0
ηmG(tk − tm)
)
= ξ>Γ˜η.
Putting everything together yields the assertion.
We will use the convention of saying that an n × n-matrix A is positive if x>Ax > 0 for all
nonzero x ∈ Rn, which makes sense also if A is not necessarily symmetric. Clearly, for a positive
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matrix A there is no nonzero x ∈ Rn for which Ax = 0, and so A is invertible. Moreover, writing a
given nonzero x ∈ Rn as x = Ay for y = A−1x 6= 0, we see that x>A−1x = y>A>y = y>Ay > 0.
So the inverse of a positive matrix is also positive. Recall that we assume (2) throughout this paper.
Lemma 3.2. The matrices Γθ, Γ˜, Γθ + Γ˜, Γθ − Γ˜ are positive for all θ ≥ 0. In particular, all terms
in (7) are well-defined and the denominators in (7) are strictly positive.
Proof. That Γ is positive definite, and hence positive, follows directly from (2). Therefore, for nonzero
x ∈ RN+1,
0 < x>Γx = x>(Γ˜ + Γ˜>)x = x>Γ˜x+ x>Γ˜>x = 2x>Γ˜x,
which shows that the matrix Γ˜ is positive. Next, Γ − Γ˜ = Γ˜> and so this matrix is also positive.
Clearly, the sum of two positive matrices is also positive, which shows that Γθ + Γ˜ = Γ + Γ˜ + 2θ Id
and Γθ − Γ˜ = Γ− Γ˜ + 2θ Id are positive for θ ≥ 0.
Lemma 3.3. For given time grid T and initial values X0 and Y0, there exists at most one Nash
equilibrium in the class X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T).
Proof. We assume by way of contradiction that there exist two distinct Nash equilibria (ξ0,η0) and
(ξ1,η1) inX (X0,T)×X (Y0,T). Here, the fact that the two Nash equilibria are distinct means that
they are not P-a.s. equal. Then we define for α ∈ [0, 1]
ξα := αξ1 + (1− α)ξ0 and ηα := αη1 + (1− α)η0.
We furthermore let
f(α) := E
[
CT(ξ
α|η0) + CT(ηα|ξ0) + CT(ξ1−α|η1) + CT(η1−α|ξ1)
]
.
Since according to (2) the matrix Γθ is positive definite, the functional
ξ 7−→ E[CT(ξ|η) ] = E
[ 1
2
ξ>Γθξ + ξ>Γ˜η
]
is strictly convex with respect to ξ. Since the two Nash equilibria (ξ0,η0) and (ξ1,η1) are distinct,
f(α) must also be strictly convex in α and have its unique minimum in α = 0. That is,
f(α) > f(0) for α > 0.
It follows that
lim
h↓0
f(h)− f(0)
h
=
df(α)
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
≥ 0. (12)
Next, by the symmetry of Γθ,
E[CT(ξα|η) ] = E
[
1
2
α2(ξ1)>Γθξ1 + α(1− α)(ξ1)>Γθξ0 + 1
2
(1− α)2(ξ0)>Γθξ0
+α(ξ1)>Γ˜η + (1− α)(ξ0)>Γ˜η
]
.
Therefore,
d
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
E[CT(ξα|η) ] = E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Γθξ0 + (ξ1 − ξ0)>Γ˜η
]
.
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Hence, it follows that
d
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
f(α)
= E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Γθξ0 + (ξ1 − ξ0)>Γ˜η0 + (ξ0 − ξ1)>Γθξ1 + (ξ0 − ξ1)>Γ˜η1
+(η1 − η0)>Γθη0 + (η1 − η0)>Γ˜ξ0 + (η0 − η1)>Γθη1 + (η0 − η1)>Γ˜ξ1
]
= −E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Γθ(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>Γθ(η1 − η0)
]
+E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Γ˜(η0 − η1) + (ξ1 − ξ0)>Γ˜>(η0 − η1)
]
= −E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Γθ(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>Γθ(η1 − η0)
]
− E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Γ(η1 − η0)
]
.
Now,
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Γ(η1 − η0) + 1
2
(
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Γθ(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>Γθ(η1 − η0)
)
≥ 1
2
(
(ξ1 − ξ0 + η1 − η0)>Γ(ξ1 − ξ0 + η1 − η0)
)
≥ 0.
Thus, and because the two Nash equilibria (ξ0,η0) and (ξ1,η1) are distinct, we have
d
dα
∣∣∣
α=0+
f(α) ≤ −1
2
E
[
(ξ1 − ξ0)>Γ(ξ1 − ξ0) + (η1 − η0)>Γ(η1 − η0)
]
< 0,
which contradicts (12). Therefore, there can exist at most one Nash equilibrium in the class
X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T).
Now let us introduce the class
Xdet(Z0,T) :=
{
ζ ∈X (Z0,T)
∣∣∣ ζ is deterministic}
of deterministic strategies in X (Z0,T). A Nash equilibrium in the class Xdet(X0,T) ×Xdet(Y0,T)
is defined in the same way as in Definition 2.4.
Lemma 3.4. A Nash equilibrium in the class Xdet(X0,T) ×Xdet(Y0,T) of deterministic strategies
is also a Nash equilibrium in the class X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T) of adapted strategies.
Proof. Assume that (ξ∗,η∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the classXdet(X0,T)×Xdet(Y0,T) of determin-
istic strategies. We need to show that ξ∗ minimizes E[CT(ξ|η∗) ] and η∗ minimizes E[CT(η|ξ∗) ] in
the respective classes X (X0,T) and X (Y0,T) of adapted strategies. To this end, let ξ ∈X (X0,T)
be given. We define ξ ∈Xdet(X0,T) by ξk = E[ ξk ] for k = 0, 1, . . . , N .
Applying Jensen’s inequality to the convex function RN+1 3 x 7→ x>Γθx, we obtain
E[CT(ξ|η∗) ] = E
[1
2
ξ>Γθξ + ξ>Γ˜η∗
]
= E
[1
2
ξ>Γθξ
]
+ ξ
>
Γ˜η∗
≥ 1
2
ξ
>
Γθξ + ξ
>
Γ˜η∗ = E[CT(ξ|η∗) ]
≥ E[CT(ξ∗|η∗) ].
This shows that ξ∗ minimizes E[CT(ξ|η∗) ] over ξ ∈ X (X0,T). One can show analogously that η∗
minimizes E[CT(η|ξ∗) ] over η ∈X (Y0,T), which completes the proof.
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Remark 3.5. Before proving Theorem 2.5, we briefly explain how to derive heuristically the explicit
form (8) of the equilibrium strategies. By Lemma 3.1 and the method of Lagrange multipliers, a
necessary condition for (ξ∗,η∗) to be a Nash equilibrium inXdet(X0,T)×Xdet(Y0,T) is the existence
of α, β ∈ R, such that {
Γθξ
∗ + Γ˜η∗ = α1;
Γθη
∗ + Γ˜ξ∗ = β1.
(13)
By adding the equations in (13) we obtain
(Γθ + Γ˜)(ξ
∗ + η∗) = (α + β)1. (14)
By Lemma 3.2, the matrix Γθ + Γ˜ is positive and hence invertible, so that (14) can be solved for
ξ∗ + η∗. Since we must also have 1>(ξ∗ + η∗) = X0 + Y0, we obtain
ξ∗ + η∗ =
(X0 + Y0)
1>(Γθ + Γ˜)−11
(Γθ + Γ˜)
−11 = (X0 + Y0)v.
Similarly, by subtracting the two equations in (13) yields
(Γθ − Γ˜)(ξ∗ − η∗) = (α− β)1.
It follows again from Lemma 3.2 that (Γθ − Γ˜) is invertible, and so we have
ξ∗ − η∗ = (X0 − Y0)
1T (Γθ − Γ˜)−11
(Γθ − Γ˜)−11 = (X0 − Y0)w.
Thus, ξ∗ and η∗ ought to be given by (8).
Proof of Theorem 2.5. By Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 all we need to show is that (8) defines a Nash equi-
librium in the class Xdet(X0,T)×Xdet(Y0,T) of deterministic strategies. For (ξ,η) ∈Xdet(X0,T)×
Xdet(Y0,T) we have
E[CT(ξ|η) ] = 1
2
ξ>Γθξ + ξ>Γ˜η. (15)
Therefore minimizing E[CT(ξ|η) ] over ξ ∈ Xdet(X0,T) is equivalent to the minimization of the
quadratic form on the right-hand side of (15) over ξ ∈ RN+1 under the constraint 1>ξ = X0.
Now we prove that the strategies ξ∗ and η∗ given by (8) are indeed optimal. We have
Γθξ
∗ + Γ˜η∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)(Γθ + Γ˜)v +
1
2
(X0 − Y0)(Γθ − Γ˜)w = µ1,
where
µ =
(X0 + Y0)
21>(Γθ + Γ˜)1
+
(X0 − Y0)
21>(Γθ − Γ˜)1
.
Now let ξ ∈Xdet(X0,T) be arbitrary and define ζ := ξ− ξ∗. Then we have ζ>1 = 0. Hence, by the
symmetry of Γθ,
1
2
ξ>Γθξ + ξ>Γ˜η∗ =
1
2
(ξ∗)>Γθξ∗ +
1
2
ζ>Γθζ + ζ>Γθξ∗ + (ξ∗)>Γ˜η∗ + ζ>Γ˜η∗
=
1
2
(ξ∗)>Γθξ∗ + (ξ∗)>Γ˜η∗ +
1
2
ζ>Γθζ + µζ>1
≥ 1
2
(ξ∗)>Γθξ∗ + (ξ∗)>Γ˜η∗,
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where in the last step we have used that Γθ is positive definite and that ζ
>1 = 0. Therefore ξ∗
minimizes (15) in the class Xdet(X0,T) for η = η∗. In the same way, one shows that η∗ minimizes
E[CT(η|ξ∗) ] over η ∈Xdet(X0,T).
Proof of Proposition 2.6. Following Lemma 3.1, the expected cost functional with x 7→ τ(|x|) replac-
ing x 7→ θx2 is given by
E[C T(ξ|η) ] := E
[
ξ>Γξ + ξ>Γ˜η +
N∑
k=0
τ(|ξk|)
]
, ξ ∈X (X0,T), η ∈X (Y0,T).
Now let ξ∗ and η∗ be as in Theorem 2.5. Since both ξ∗ and η∗ are deterministic, |ξ∗k| and |η∗k| take
just finitely many values as k ranges from 0 to N . After adding the value 0 to this list and arranging
it in increasing order, the values from that list correspond to numbers 0 = c0 < c1 < c2 < · · · < cM−1.
Then we take cM := cM−1 + 1 and let τ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) be the linear interpolation of the function
x 7→ θx2 with respect to the grid c0, c1, . . . , cM and with linear continuation beyond [cM−1, cM ]. Then
τ(|ξ∗k|) = θ(ξ∗k)2 and τ(|η∗k|) = θ(η∗k)2 holds for all k, and it follows that E[C T(ξ∗|η∗) ] = E[CT(ξ∗|η∗) ].
Let us now suppose by way of contradiction that (ξ∗,η∗) is not a Nash equilibrium inX (X0,T)×
X (Y0,T). Then there exist ξ ∈X (X0,T) or η ∈X (Y0,T) such that E[C T(ξ|η∗) ] < E[C T(ξ∗|η∗) ]
or E[C T(η|ξ∗) ] < E[C T(η∗|ξ∗) ]. By symmetry, it is sufficient to consider only the first possibility.
For α ∈ [0, 1], let ξα := (1 − α)ξ∗ + αξ. By the convexity of the expected cost functional, we have
E[C T(ξα|η∗) ] < E[C T(ξ∗|η∗) ] for all α ∈ (0, 1]. By using the boundedness of admissible strategies
(Definition 2.1 (a)), there is ε ∈ (0, 1] such that |ξεk| ≤ cM for k = 0, . . . , N P-a.s. Thus, the convexity
of x 7→ θx2 implies that τ(|ξεk|) ≥ θ(ξεk)2 P-a.s. for k = 0, . . . , N . Hence,
E[C T(ξε|η∗) ] ≥ E[CT(ξε|η∗) ] > E[CT(ξ∗|η∗) ] = E[C T(ξ∗|η∗) ],
which is the desired contradiction.
3.2 Proof of Propositions 2.8 and 2.9
Proof of Proposition 2.8. According to (7) and Lemma 3.2, the vector w is a positive multiple of
(Γθ − Γ˜)−11. The matrix Γθ − Γ˜ is an invertible upper triangular matrix, whose diagonal entries are
all equal to ν := G(0)/2 + 2θ. We may assume without loss of generality that ν = 1; otherwise we
divide G by ν. Then we will have G(0) > 1, and there exists δ1 > 0 such that also G(δ1) > 1. Now
we take δ ≤ δ1 such that G is nonincreasing in [0, 2δ]. The off-diagonal elements of Γθ − Γ˜ are equal
to Γi,j = G(tj−1 − ti−1) for i < j and they vanish for i > j. Let u = (u1, . . . , uN+1)> = (Γθ − Γ˜)−11.
A straightforward computation shows that
uN+1 = 1, uN = 1− ΓN,N+1, and uN−1 = 1− ΓN−1,N+1 + ΓN−1,N(ΓN,N+1 − 1).
Clearly, uN+1 > 0 holds trivially. Next, due to our choice of δ, we have Γi−1,i = G(ti − ti−1) > 1 for
i = N,N + 1. In particular, uN < 0 follows. Moreover,
uN−1 > 1− ΓN−1,N+1 + (ΓN,N+1 − 1) = G(tN − tN−1)−G(tN − tN−2) ≥ 0,
where the latter inequality follows from the assumption that G is nonincreasing in [0, 2δ].
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Proof of Proposition 2.9. Recall that here G(t) = λe−ρt for constants λ, ρ > 0. We need to compute
the inverse of the matrix Γθ − Γ˜. Setting κ := 2θ/λ+ 12 and a := e−ρT , we have
Γθ − Γ˜ = λ

κ a
1
N a
2
N · · · aN−1N a
0 κ a
1
N · · · aN−2N aN−1N
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . κ a
1
N
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 κ

.
It is easy to verify that the inverse of this matrix is given by
ΠN :=
1
λ

1
κ
−a 1N
κ2
−a 2N (κ−1)
κ3
· · · −a
N−1
N (κ−1)N−2
κN
−aNN (κ−1)N−1
κN+1
0 1
κ
−a 1N
κ2
· · · −a
N−2
N (κ−1)N−3
κN−1
−aN−1N (κ−1)N−2
κN
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 1
κ
−a 1N
κ2
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1
κ

.
Let us denote by u = (u1, u2, . . . , uN+1) ∈ RN+1 the vector λΠN1. Then we have uN+1 = 1κ and, for
n = 1, . . . , N , un = un+1 − a(N+1−n)/N(κ− 1)N−n/κN+2−n. That is,
un =
1
κ
− a
1
N
κ2
N∑
m=n
(a 1N (κ− 1)
κ
)N−m
=
1
κ
− a
1
N
κ2
N−n∑
k=0
(a 1N (κ− 1)
κ
)k
=
1
κ
[
1− a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N + (−1)
N+1−n a
1
N
κ(1− a 1N ) + a 1N
(a 1N (1− κ)
κ
)N+1−n]
.
(16)
If θ = 0, we have
un = 2
[
1− 2a
1
N
1 + a
1
N
+ (−1)N+1−n2a
N+2−n
N
1 + a
1
N
]
.
Since a < 1, we have
0 ≤ 1− 2a
1
N
1 + a
1
N
< 1− a 1N −→ 0 as N ↑ ∞.
On the other hand, we have
2a
N+2−n
N
1 + a
1
N
≥ aN+2−nN ≥ aN+1N −→ a as N ↑ ∞.
Therefore, the signs of un will alternate as soon as N is large enough to have 1− a 1N < aN+1N . This
proves part (a). As for part (b), since the expression (16) is continuous in κ, the signs of un will
still alternate if, for fixed N ≥ N0, we take κ slightly larger than 1/2. (Note however that the term
(1− κ)N/κN tends to zero faster than 1− a 1N , so we cannot get this result uniformly in N).
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3.3 Proof of Theorem 2.7
Proof of (a)⇒(b) in Theorem 2.7. It is well known and easy to see that G(0) ≥ G(t) for all t ≥ 0,
due to our assumption that the function G(| · |) is positive definite. The log-convexity of G therefore
implies that G must be nonincreasing in a neighborhood of zero. Therefore, Proposition 2.8 is
applicable. It implies that w must have some components with negative sign if θ < θ∗. This yields
the assertion.
The proof of the implication (b)⇒(a) in Theorem 2.7 relies on the following classical result on the
signs of power series, which is due to Kaluza [16] and Szego˝ [27]. Here we state it in the formulation
of Jurkat [15, Theorem 3].
Theorem 3.6 (Kaluza sign criterion). For n ≥ 0, let an > 0 be coefficients in the power series
f(x) =
∑∞
n=0 anx
n satisfying the condition that an+1/an is nondecreasing in n ≥ 0. Then the
coefficients bn of the formal reciprocal power series
1
f(x)
=
∞∑
n=0
bnx
n
satisfy b0 = 1/a0 > 0 and bn ≤ 0 for n ≥ 1. If, moreover, the power series for f is convergent for
|x| < 1, then it follows that limx↑1 1f(x) =
∑∞
n=0 bn exists and is nonnegative.
This result is connected with our situation as follows. Let (an)n≥0 be a sequence of numbers such
that a0 > 0 and consider the upper triangular Toeplitz matrix A = (a˜i,j)i,j=1,...,N with coefficients
a˜i,j = aj−i if i ≤ j and a˜i,j = 0 otherwise. The inverse B = A−1 is then also an upper triangular
Toeplitz matrix. It is generated by the sequence (bn)n≥0 that satisfies b0 = 1/a0 and is otherwise
determined recursively through the convolution identities
m∑
k=0
akbm−k = 0, m ≥ 1.
But these conditions also determine the coefficients (bn)n≥0 of the (formal) reciprocal of the power
series
∑∞
n=0 anx
n, so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the inversion of triangular
Toeplitz matrices and the formal development of reciprocal power series; see [28].
Proof of (b)⇒(a) in Theorem 2.7. Let a0 = G(0)/2 + 2θ and an = G(nT/N) for n ≥ 1. Then the
matrix Γθ−Γ˜ is equal to the upper triangular Toeplitz matrix constructed as above from the sequence
(an)n≥0. Clearly, we have an > 0 for all n, and the fact that G is log-convex implies that an+1/an
is nondecreasing in n ≥ 1. If θ ≥ θ∗, then we will also have a1/a0 ≤ a2/a1. Moreover, the fact that
G is positive definite implies once again that G(t) ≤ G(0) for all t so that the sequence (an)n∈N is
bounded and the power series
∑∞
n=0 anx
n converges for |x| < 1. It follows that we may apply all
parts of Theorem 3.6. It yields that the coefficients (bn)n≥0 satisfy b0 > 0, bn ≤ 0 for n ≥ 1, and
that
∑∞
n=0 bn exists and is nonnegative. Therefore, we must have
∑k
n=0 bn ≥ 0 for all k ≥ 0. But
these sums coincide with the components of the vector (Γθ − Γ˜)−11, which is in turn proportional to
w.
Proof of (c)⇒(b) in Theorem 2.7. We consider the case N = 1. By definition, v is proportional to
the vector
2 det(Γθ + Γ˜)(Γθ + Γ˜)
−11 =
(
λ(3− 2a) + γ + 4θ
λ(3− 4a)− γ + 4θ
)
.
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Clearly, the first component of this vector is positive for all a ∈ (0, 1) and θ ≥ 0. By sending a ↑ 1
one sees, however, that the second component is negative for θ < θ∗ and a sufficiently close to 1.
Thus, we cannot have v ≥ 0 in this case.
Now we prepare for the proof of the implication (b)⇒(c) in Theorem 2.7. It relies on results
for so-called M -matrices stated in the book [5] by Berman and Plemmons. We first introduce some
notations. If A is a matrix or vector, we will write
(a) A ≥ 0 if each entry of A is nonnegative;
(b) A > 0 if A ≥ 0 and at least one entry is strictly positive;
(c) A 0 if each entry of A is strictly positive.
Definition 3.7 (Definition 1.2 in Chapter 6 of [5]). A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is called a nonsingular
M-matrix if it is of the form A = s Id − B, where the matrix B ∈ Rn×n satisfies B ≥ 0 and the
parameter s > 0 is strictly larger than the spectral radius of B.
Also recall that a matrix A ∈ Rn×n is called a Z-matrix if all its off-diagonal elements are
nonpositive. Berman and Plemmons [5] give 50 equivalent characterizations of the fact that a given
Z-matrix is a nonsingular M -matrix. We will need three of them here and summarize them in the
following statement.
Theorem 3.8 (From Theorem 2.3 in Chapter 6 of [5]). For a Z-matrix A ∈ Rn×n, the following
conditions are equivalent.
(a) A is a nonsingular M-matrix;
(b) All the leading principal minors of A are positive.
(c) A is inverse-positive; that is, A−1 exists and A−1 ≥ 0.
(d) A+ α Id is nonsingular for all α ≥ 0.
We start with the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 3.9. A triangular Z-matrix A ∈ Rn×n with positive diagonal is an M-matrix.
Proof. Let
A =

a11 a12 · · · a1n
0 a22 · · · a2n
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · · · · ann

be an upper triangular Z-matrix with positive diagonal. Then all of its leading principle minors are
positive:
A[k] =
k∏
i=1
aii > 0, for k ∈ 1, 2, . . . , N.
By Theorem 3.8 (b), A is an M -matrix.
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It will be convenient to define the matrices
Φij := e
−ρ|ti−1−tj−1| and Ψij := 1
for i, j = 1, . . . , N + 1. Recalling that G(t) = λe−ρt + γ, we then have Γ = λΦ + γΨ and Γθ =
λΦ + γΨ + 2θ Id. Moreover, for any matrix A we let
A˜ij :=

Aij if i > j,
1
2
Aij if i = j,
0 otherwise.
Note that this notation is consistent with (6), and we get Γ˜ = λΦ˜ + γΦ˜. We finally define
Φ̂ := Φ˜ +
1
2
Id.
Lemma 3.10. For α ≥ 0, the inverse of the matrix Φ̂ + αΦ is given by
β −a 1N µβ2 −a 2N µβ3 · · · −aN−1N µβN − aα1+αβN
−a 1N β (1 + (1− a 4N )α)β2 −a 1N µνβ3 · · · −aN−2N µνβN −aN−1N µβN
0 −a 1N β (1 + (1− a 4N )α)β2 · · · −aN−3N µνβN−1 −aN−2N µβN−1
0 0
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . −a 1N β (1 + (1− a 4N )α)β2 −a 1N µβ2
0 · · · · · · 0 −a 1N β β

,
where
β =
(
1 + (1− a 2N )α)−1, µ = (1− a 2N )α, ν = (1− a 2N )(1 + α).
Proof. Let the matrix in the statement be denoted by P . We rewrite P as
Pij =

β, if i = j = 1 or i = j = N + 1;
(1 + (1− a 4N )α)β2, if i = j ∈ {2, . . . , N};
−a 1N β, if i− j = 1;
−a j−iN βj−i+2µν, if j − i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 2} and i 6= 1 and j 6= N + 1;
−a j−iN βj−i+1µ, if j − i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} and either i = 1 or j = N + 1;
− aα
1+α
βN , if i = 1 and j = N + 1,
0, if i ≥ j + 2.
On the other hand, the matrix Φ̂ + αΦ can be written as
(Φ̂ + αΦ)ij =

1 + α, if i = j;
αa
j−i
N , if i < j;
(1 + α)a
i−j
N , if i > j.
Checking
N+1∑
k=1
Pik(Φ̂ + αΦ)kj =
N+1∑
k=1
(Φ̂ + αΦ)ikPkj = δij
for all i and j completes the proof.
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Let
Ψ̂ := Ψ˜> − 1
2
Id.
Lemma 3.11. The matrix Φ−1
(
Φ̂− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)
is a Z-matrix and a nonsingular M-matrix.
Proof. It was shown in [1, Theorem 3.4] that
Φ−1 =
1
1− a 2N

1 −a 1N 0 · · · · · · 0
−a 1N 1 + a 2N −a 1N 0 · · · 0
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . −a 1N 1 + a 2N −a 1N
0 · · · · · · 0 −a 1N 1

. (17)
The matrix Φ̂− γ
λ
Ψ̂ is equal to
1 −γ
λ
−γ
λ
· · · · · · −γ
λ
a
1
N 1 −γ
λ
· · · · · · −γ
λ
a
2
N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . a
1
N 1 −γ
λ
a · · · · · · a 2N a 1N 1

.
A straightforward computation now yields that the matrix (1− a 2N )Φ−1(Φ̂− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)
is equal to
1− a
2
N −a
1
N − γ
λ
−(1− a
1
N ) γ
λ
−(1− a
1
N ) γ
λ
· · · −(1− a
1
N ) γ
λ
0 1 + a
1
N γ
λ
−a
1
N − (1− a
1
N + a
2
N ) γ
λ
−(1− a
1
N )2 γ
λ
· · · −(1− a
1
N )2 γ
λ
0 0 1 + a
1
N γ
λ
−a
1
N − (1− a
1
N + a
2
N ) γ
λ
· · · −(1− a
1
N )2 γ
λ
0
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. −(1− a
1
N )2 γ
λ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 0 1 + a
1
N γ
λ
−a
1
N − (1− a
1
N + a
2
N ) γ
λ
0 · · · · · · 0 0 1 + a
1
N γ
λ

,
which is an upper triangular Z-matrix with positive diagonal. By Lemma 3.9, Φ−1
(
Φ̂− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)
is hence
a nonsingular M -matrix.
Lemma 3.12. For δ ≥ 0 the matrix Λδ := Φ−1
(
Φ̂− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)
+ δΦ−1 is a nonsingular M-matrix.
Proof. For δ = 0 the result follows from Lemma 3.11. So let us assume henceforth that δ > 0. Note
first that Λδ is a Z-matrix since both Φ
−1(Φ̂ − γ
λ
Ψ̂
)
and Φ−1 are Z matrices by Lemma 3.11 and
(17), respectively. Hence condition (d) of Theorem 3.8 will imply that Λδ is a nonsingular M -matrix
as soon as we can show that Λδ + α Id is invertible for all α ≥ 0.
In a first step, we note that taking γ = 0 in Lemma 3.11 yields that Φ−1Φ̂ is a nonsingular
M -matrix. Hence (α Id + Φ−1Φ̂)−1 ≥ 0 for all α ≥ 0. It follows that(
Φ̂ + αΦ
)−1
1 =
(
Id + (αΦ)−1Φ̂
)−1
(αΦ)−11 =
(
α Id + Φ−1Φ̂
)−1
Φ−11 > 0,
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because by [1, Example 3.5],
Φ−11 =
1
1 + a
1
N
(
1, 1− a 1N , . . . , 1− a 1N , 1
)T
 0. (18)
Since moreover (Φ̂ +αΦ)−1 is a Z-matrix by Lemma 3.10, it follows that (Φ̂ +αΦ)−1 is a diagonally
dominant Z-matrix for all α ≥ 0.
In the next step, we show that the matrix
Q := (Φ̂ + αΦ)−1
(
δ Id− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)
is a Z-matrix. Denoting again P := (Φ̂ + αΦ)−1, we get
Qij = δPij − γ
λ
j−1∑
k=1
Pik,
with the convention that
∑0
k=1 ak = 0. It follows that Qii ≥ 0 for all i, because Pii ≥ 0 and
γ
λ
∑i−1
k=1 Pik ≤ 0 by the fact that P is a Z-matrix. Since P is diagonally dominant, we have
∑j−1
k=1 Pik ≥
0 for any j > i and hence Qij = δPij − γλ
∑j−1
k=1 Pik ≤ 0 for j > i. Using the fact that Pik = 0 for
k ≤ i− 1, we get that for j < i
Qij = δPij − γ
λ
j−1∑
k=1
Pik = δPij ≤ 0.
This shows that Q is a Z-matrix.
We show next that Q is a nonsingular M -matrix. To this end, we note first that the triangular
matrix
(
δ Id− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)
is invertible under our assumption δ > 0. As a matter of fact, an easy calculation
verifies that its inverse is given by
1
δ

1 σ σ(1 + σ) · · · σ(1 + σ)N−2 σ(1 + σ)N−1
0 1 σ σ(1 + σ) · · · σ(1 + σ)N−2
0 0 1 σ · · · σ(1 + σ)N−3
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 1 σ
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1

≥ 0,
where σ := γ
λδ
> 0. Hence,
Q−1 =
(
δ Id− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)−1
(Φ̂ + αΦ) ≥ 0.
So Theorem 3.8 (c) shows that Q is a nonsingular M -matrix.
For the final step, we note first that Theorem 3.8 (d) implies that Id + Q is a nonsingular
M -matrix. In particular, ( Id +Q)−1 exists, and so we can define the matrix
( Id +Q)−1(Φ̂ + αΦ)−1Φ =
(
δ Id + Φ̂ + αΦ− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)−1
Φ
=
(
Id + (δΦ−1)−1
(
Φ−1
(
Φ̂− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)
+ α Id
))−1
(δΦ−1)−1
=
(
δΦ−1 + Φ−1
(
Φ̂− γ
λ
Ψ̂
)
+ α Id
)−1
= (Λδ + α Id)
−1.
This proves that Λδ + α Id is invertible and the proof is complete.
23
Lemma 3.13. Let A be an invertible matrix and suppose that α ∈ R is such that A+αΨ is invertible.
Then the vector A−11 is proportional to (A+ αΨ)−11.
Proof. Note that Ψx is proportional to 1 for any vector x. Hence,
(A+ αΨ)A−11 = ( Id + αΨA−1)1 = (1 + β)1
for some constant β. Applying (A+ αΨ)−1 to both sides of this equation yields the result.
We are now ready to prove the remaining implication of Theorem 2.7.
Proof of (b)⇒(c) in Theorem 2.7. We need to show that v has only nonnegative components for
θ ≥ λ+γ
4
. The vector v is proportional to (Γθ + Γ˜)
−11. When setting
δ :=
4θ − (λ+ γ)
2λ
≥ 0,
we find that
Γθ + Γ˜− γΨ = λΦ + γΨ + 2θ Id + λΦ˜ + γΨ˜− γΨ
= λΦ + 2θ Id + λΦ˜− γΨ˜> = λΦ + λ
(
Φ̂− γ
λ
Ψ̂ + δ Id
)
= λΦ
(
Λδ + Id
)
,
and we know from Lemma 3.12 that the latter matrix is invertible. It therefore follows from
Lemma 3.13 that v is proportional to(
Φ(Λδ + Id)
)−1
1 = (Λδ + Id)
−1Φ−11.
As noted in (18), we have Φ−11 0. Moreover, Λδ, and hence Λδ+ Id, are nonsingular M -matrices by
Lemma 3.12 and Theorem 3.8 (d). Via Theorem 3.8 (c), these facts imply that
(
Φ(Λδ + Id)
)−1
1 ≥ 0
and in turn that v ≥ 0.
4 Conclusion and outlook
We have considered a Nash equilibrium for two competing agents in a market impact model with
general transient price impact. We have seen that without transaction costs both agents engage
in a “hot-potato game”, which has some similarities to certain events during the Flash Crash that
have been reported in [10, 17]. We have then analyzed the behavior of equilibrium strategies as
functions of transaction costs, θ, and trading frequency, N . In Theorem 2.7 we have determined the
critical value of transaction costs at which the equilibrium strategies v and w become buy-only or
sell-only. In Section 2.4, numerical simulations have shown that expected costs can be increasing
in the trading frequency for small θ, while they generally decrease for sufficiently large θ. We have
also seen that the expected costs of both agents can be lower with additional transaction costs than
without. These observations provide some support for the common claim that additional transaction
costs can, at least under certain circumstances such as during a fire sale, have a calming effect on
financial markets.
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